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EFFECT OF THE ANSWER IN EQUITY OF A CORPORATION.-

Where, to a bill in equity against a corporation, the defendant
files an answer under its corporate seal, the truth of the facts
contained therein being verified by the oath of one of the officers
of the corporation, who has knowledge of the facts, does the
answer come within the rule of equity which allows it to be overcome only by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness
with corroborating testimony, or is the answer mere pleading,
having the effect only to place the facts in issue? In Kane v.
Schuylkill FireInsurance Co., 199 Pa. 198 (1901), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania lays down the former proposition, viz,
that the answer of a corporation is as fully protected by the rule
as the answer of an individual, and therefore can be overcome,
if at all, only by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness,
with corroborating circumstances.

NOTES.

Where the defendant is a natural person, the applicability of
the rule is admitted in all jurisdictions; in fact it has existed
in England from the earliest times, as is well shown by the interesting discussion contained in the report of the referee in Kane v.
Ins. Co., supra. It is only where it has been applied to the case
of a corporation defendant that there has been any divergence of
opinion, and, even then, a close examination of the authorities
discloses very little conflict.
Answers of corporations in equity may be divided into two
classes: those which are merely under the corporate seal, unsupported by oath; and those which are verified by the oath of an
officer who is cognizant of the facts, to the truth of which he
swears. Answers of the first class-those which are unsupported
by oath-have almost uniformly been regarded as mere pleading
and as not within the equitable rule: Union Banke v. Geary, 5
Pet. 111; Lovett v. Saw Mill Association, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 54
) ; Bouldin
(
) ; Iron Co. v. Wingert, 8 Gill (Md.) 170 (
) ; and the text writers are to the
v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 18 (
same effect: Langdell's Eq. PI., §78; Brightley's Eq., §686;
Cooper's Eq. PI., p. 325; Story's Ep. P1., §874; 2 Daniels
Chan. Prac., §843; Mitford's & Tyler's Eq. P1., p. 107; 1 Am.
and Eng. Encyc. of Pleading and Prac., p. 956.
It is when we come to examine the authorities of the second
class,-those in which the corporation's answer is verified by the
affidavit of an officer,-that we find some difference of opinion.
This seems to have arisen, chiefly, from the habit of courts
from imagining that an authority lays down the proposition that
it is impossible for the answer of a corporation to have the same
effect as the answer of an individual, when, in reality, all that
the authority decides is that an answer not under oath does not
have the effect of an answer under oath, without even considering
the question of the capacity of a corporation to answer under
the oath of one of its officers, or the effect of such an answer.
But even when this distinction has been called to the courts'
attention, it has not always prevailed, as will be seen from a
glance at the decisions.
The leading case upon the subject is Carpenter v. Provident
Ins. Co., 4 Howard, 185, a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States. A bill in equity was filed against an insurance
company, and a responsive answer was filed under the corporate
seal, sworn to by the president, who was not such at the time of
the alleged transaction, but who had access to the records of the
corporation. The truth of the averments of the answer was
verified by the president "according to the best of his knowledge
and belief." The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the answer could not be overthrown by the testimony of one
witness, and affirmed a decree in favor of the defendant, Mr.
Justice Woodbury saying (p. 218) :
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"It has been adjudged in Solomon v. Cladgett, 3 Bland, 141,
165, that the answer of a corporation if called for by the bill,
and it is responsive to the call, though made by a corporation
aggregate by its seal and not under oath, is competent evidence,
and cannot be overturned by the testimony of one witness alone.
We do not go to this extent, but see no reason why such an answer,
by a corporation, under its seal and sworn to by a proper officer,
with some means of knowledge on the subject, should not generally impose an obligation on the complainant to prove the fact
by more than one witness (5 Pet. 111, 4 Wash. D. C., 601.)
Here the denial by the corporation is explicit and responsive to
the bill, and its truth sworn to by its president, according to his
best knowledge and belief."
The rule was again applied in Hayward v. Eliot Nat. Bank, 4
Clifford, 294, where, on a bill in equity against a national bank,
the defendant filed an answer, sworn to by its officers. Clifford,
J., held the answer to be conclusive, saying (p. 296) .
"Repeated decisions of the Supreme Court have established the
rule that an answer responsive to the allegations of the bill, if it
have respect to matters within the knowledge of the pleader and
be duly sworn to, must be taken to be true, unless disproved by
two witnesses, or by one witness and corroboraing circumstances
which give the opposing testimony greater weight than the
answer. Unsworn answers do not have that effect, but if the
answer be duly sworn to, even though the suit be against a corporation, and the oath be by one of its principal officers, the answer
will have that effect if it be responsive to the bill, and be clear
and positive in its terms."

In Pennsylvania, prior to the decision in Kane v. Ins. Co.,
supra, a ruling had apparently been made upon the question in
Waller v. Kingston Coal Co., 191 Pa., 193, in which case a bill in
equity for an account was filed against a corporation, whose
answer, under the corporate seal, was verified by its secretary in
the following words: "* * * * being duly sworn, says that
the facts set forth in the following answer, so far as they are
stated upon his own knowledge are true, and so far as they are
stated upon information, he verily believes to be true." (This
affidavit is set out in the paper book of the appellant in that case,
p. 86.) Judge Albright, in the court below, held that the answer
could be overcome only by the testimony of two witnesses, or of
one witness and corroborating circumstances, saying:
"I fail to find any evidence supporting plaintiff's contention in
those regards, much less the amount of proof required to overcome such denial. Such answer is conclusive in defendant's favor
unless it is overcome by the satisfactory testimony of two opposing witnesses, or of one witness corroborated by other circumstances and facts which give to it a greater weight than the answer or which are equivalent in weight to a second witness."
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On an appeal by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, per curiam, affirmed the decree, saying:
"This record discloses no substantial error in any of the
learned court's rulings, findings of fact or conclusions of law
drawn therefrom."
But it should be remembered that there is no reason to apply
an individual defendant, where the officer making the affidavit
does not possess personal knowledge of the facts, to the truth of
which he swears. Since the answer, even of an individual, would,
under these circumstances, have merely the effect of pleading,
and no force whatever as evidence (Bussier v. Weekey, 11 Pa.
Super. Ct., 463), the attention of the court in the case of a corporation defendant is immediately directed to the inquiry, as it
would be in the case of an answer by an individual: "Did or did
not the officer have personal knowledge of the facts to which he
swears ?" One of the latest utterances upon the subject is in Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Davidson, 97 Fed., 696, where the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) denied the conclusiveness of the answer solely upon the ground that the officer
making the affidavit did not have personal knowledge of the facts,
and admitting the applicability of the rule in a case similar to
Kane v. Ins. Co., supra. Other decisions to the same effect are
Reijel v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa., 134, and Gantt v. Cox &
Lous. Co., 199 Pa., 208.
A question, analogous to the one under discussion, is raised
where, after a preliminary injunction has been granted against
a corporation, the latter files an answer denying the equity of
the bill. It was at first thought that a mere answer under the
corporate seal would have the effect of dissolving the injunction,
but now it is well settled that it is only where the answer is sworn
to by an officer with knowledge of the facts that this result follows,
and courts are unanimous in ascribing such a result to an answer
so verified. See Haigkt v. Morris Aqueduct, 4 Washington
C. C., 605; Fulton Bank v. Canal Co., 1 Paige (N. Y.) 311;
Hogan v. Bank, 10 Ala., 485; Griffin v. Bank, 17 Ala., 258.
But the contrary doctrine that the answer of a corporation
whether supported by the oath of an officer or not, has no weight
as evidence, but is merely pleading, has been asserted by the
courts of Michigan and Tennessee. In Beecher v. Anderson, 45
Mich., 543, there was an application for a mandamus upon the
sheriff, commanding him to serve a warrant of arrest for perjury
upon an officer of a corporation, the alleged perjury being contained in affidavit of the officer in support of an answer in
equity of the corporation. It was contended upon behalf of the
defendant that there was no perjury, since the affidavit of the
officer could by no possibility affect or (ive veight to the answer
of the corporation, and the court sustained this contention, saying: "The oath of W. [the officer] to the answer was wholly an
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idle ceremony. The answer was no better with it than withQut
it; it affected the issue in no manner whatever; it strengthened
no statement made in the answer, and it made no statement
evidence that would not have been evidence witlout it, and gave
no statement weight or force that it would not otherwise have
possessed." Also in Van Wyc4 v. Worrell, 2 Humph. (Tenn.)
19, an answer of a corporation, supported by the oath of its
secretary, who had knowledge of the facts, was treated as mere
pleading, See, also, Langdell's Equity Pleading, §78.
Upon principle, there is no reason why the answer of a corporation, supported by the affidavit of an officer, shovlld not
stand upon the same plane as the answer of an individual. As
was said by Mr. Justige Mitchell in Kane v. Ins. Co,, supra,
"It is said that a corporation cannot answer under oath, bvjt only
under seal, This is conceded, but it is purely technical. A corporation can only act through the persons of its officers or other
agents. Its corporate seal is not'action, but only evidence of
action by the proper officers," A corporation, when it receives
its charter, becomes a person in, the eyes of the law, and is entitled
to hold the title to its property in the same manner as an indi
vidual. In a court of law all statements of claim, affidavits of
defence, answers to interrogatories, etc,, are effective only when
under oath; and in the case of a porporation the oath
e by
one of the oicers is universally recognized as imparting to the
instrumaent executed by the corporation the same effect as the
oath of an individual would give to fn instrument executed by
him. Should a different rule be applied to the corporation's
answer in equity ? Is the corporation to be fully recognized by
a court of law, but, when it comes into a court of equity, to be
deprived of one of the safeguards which equity places about
property, and be unable to protect its property in a case where
an individual defendant would have the power? The objection
to granting this right to a corporation is, perhaps, the last
instance of the survival of the ancient doctrine that a corporation has no soul, a doctrine which, however correct in fact, has, by
the present time, been completely abandoned by the courts.
A. E.W.
SALE OF Aw ARTICLE-UNLAWFUL RESALE BY THE PURCHASER
-RECOVERY OF THE PURCHASE PRiCE.-Graves v. Johnson, 60

N. E., 383 (1901).-Intoxicating liquor was sold in Massachu-

setts by the plaintiff to defendant, the plaintiff knowing at the
time that the defendant meant to resell the liquor in contravention of the Maine liquor laws. Nothing further than mere knowledge was proven against the plaintiff. He neither expressly
agreed that the article should be unlawfully disposed of, nor did
any act, other than making the sale, in aid of the defendant's
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unlawful intention. Under such facts he was allowed by Judge
Holmes to recover. The opinion of the court was to the effect
that had there been a communicated desire of the plaintiffs to
co-operate with the defendant's present intent, as distinguished
from an understood indifference to everything beyond an ordinary
sale in Massachusetts, the plaintiff could not have recovered. The
opinion also suggested that, as in the case of attempts, the line
of proximity might vary according to the gravity of the evil
apprehended. How such a suggestion has been touched upon by
other courts will be pointed out later.
The question involved in this case is an interesting one and has
caused some conflict in authority.
An earlier Massachusetts case states the rule to be, that if the
contract was made with a view to the subsequent unlawful disposition of the goods, the seller cannot recover. Webster v. Munger,
8 Gray, 587 (1857). Holmes cited the case with approval and
seemed to think the rule amounted to the same thing as saying
that if the plaintiff expressly agreed, or communicated a desire
that the unlawful act should be done, there should be no recovery.
The case was an opinion upon a contract in violation of a prohibitory Massachusetts statute, which may have led to the somewhat narrower statement of the seller's rights. As showing
how trivial a circumstance will prevent a recovery, it appears
from the case that "in one of the written orders, the illegal purpose for which the liquor was wanted, and the time when it
would be wanted for that purpose, were indicated, and the plaintiff was urged not to fail in forwarding it to that end.'
The
objection that if mere knowledge at the time of sale be the
criterion, the plaintiff will be refused a recovery even though the
defendant should change his mind and not carry out his unlawful
purpose, would apply to the facts in Webster v. Munger. Yet
there a recovery was denied.
The rule laid down in the principal case, that mere knowledge
of the illegal act is not enough to prevent a recovery, while one
of general application in the United States, is no longer the law
in England. It was once the law there and it might be of
interest to trace briefly the history of the change. The leading
case is Holman v. Johnson, Cowp., 341 (1775), in which the
plaintiff, a resident of Dunkirk, completed in that place a contract for the sale of goods, knowing that the defendant intended
to smuggle them into England. In a suit for the price Lord
Mansfield allowed him to recover. "If the defendant had bespoke
the tea at a certain price, and the plaintiff had had any concern
in running it to England, he would have been an offender against
the laws of this country." A distinction was drawn between
offences mala in se and mala prohibita, the opinion leaning to
the view that had the former been assisted by the sale, the decision would have been otherwise. In 1767 Mansfield had made
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the distinction and allowed a recovery on a bond given to secure
the plaintiff for money advanced by him in unlawfully compounding differences in stock jobbing transactions: Faikney v.
Reynous, 4 Burr., 2069. The cases of Biggs v. Lawrence, 3
Term R., 454 (1798); Clugas v. Penalimas, 4 Term R. 466
(1791) ; Waymell v. Reed, 5 Term R., 599 (1794), all revenue
cases, in which the plaintiffs were non-suited, have been much
relied upon in later English cases as over-ruling Holman v.
Johnson. But in each case, in addition to knowledge of the
purchaser's criminal intent, the plaintiff did some act to facilitate the smuggling of the goods. In 1835, in a case with practically the same facts as Holman v. Johnson, Lord Abinger gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Pellecat v. Angell, 2 Orompt. Mees.
& Rose., 313. These revenue cases should perhaps stand in a
group by themselves. Mansfield took the view that the plaintiff
did not have to pay very high respect to the revenue laws of
England. He probably had in mind the rigorous revenue system
of the Continental countries.
A strong case is that of Barjeau v. Walmly, Str., 1249 (1795).
Plaintiff and defendant were playing at tossing up for five
guineas a throw. Defendant lost all his ready money and
plaintiff loaned him £120, quickly winning it back again. Upon
refusal to pay the bets, plaintiff was given judgment. This case
is overruled in England and would not be generally followed in
this country. In Pearce v. Brooks, L. B., 1 Ex., 213 (1866),
a.contract to sell a prostitute a brougham, with knowledge of her
calling, was held void for immorality. Nothing more than mere
knowledge was required to be shown. It was argued that the
defendant must prove the plaintiff's design and expectation of
being paid out of the proceeds of her calling, but the court held
such proof unnecessary. Pollock stated the rule broadly. "I
have always considered it as settled law that no person who contributes to the performance of an illegal act by supplying a
thing with the knowledge that it is going to be used for that purpose, can recover the price of the thing so supplied; nor can any
distinction be made between an illegal and an immoral purpose;
the rule which is applicable to the matter is, Ex turpi causa non
oritur actio."
The case is based on Lightfoot v. Tenant, I Bos. & Pull., 551
(1796); Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & A., 179 (1819), and McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 If.& W., 434 (1838). In considering the
principle established by these cases, the opinion of the court which
laid down the New York rule is worth quoting. "It was the
express object of the plaintiffs in these cases, in selling goods or
lending money, that they should be used for the unlawful purpose, and that such purpose entered into and formed a part of
the sale or loan." In the first it appeared that the goods were
sold in order that they should be shipped without license in vio-
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lation of law; in the second, money was loaned for the express
purpose of carrying out an illegal stock transaction; in the third,
money was loaned for the purpose of playing an illegal game of
hazard. If there is anything in the distinction made by the New
York court, it would seem that the case of Pearce v. Brooks
stands alone in English law as holding that mere knowledge is
enough. See Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y., 162 (1856). The
distinction was recognized, and doubt thrown on Pearce v.
Brooks in Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H., 253 (1870), where Judge
Foster, in a long and well-considered opinion, exhaustively
reviewed the authorities. In that case the vendor had solicited
orders for the sale of liquor in New Hampshire, where the sale
was prohibited, and had then completed the contract of sale in
New York. It was held that the soliciting and knowledge of the
illegal sales would not prevent recovery. The following rule
was stated: That if there was active participation, to a greater
or less extent, in the subsequent unlawful disposition or if an
expectation of profit or advantage from the unlawful disposition
entered as an essential ingredient into the original contract of
sale, and induced it, there could be no recovery. The three
cases relied upon by Pearce v. Brooks, came, in the mind of the
court, under the second branch of the rule. The distinction
between malum prohibitum and malum in se was rejected. Some
emphasis was laid on the fact that the contract was valid in New
York, the laws of which the court felt bound to respect so long as
their enforcement did not gravely endanger the welfare of New
Hampshire. The contract between this view and that of Mansfield's on the revenue laws (Holman v. Johnson) supra, is interesting to note. The distinction between malum prohibitum and
malum in se was obliterated as far back as 1801 in Aubert v.
Maze, 2 B. & P., 371, in which the case of Faikney & Reynous
was questioned. To the same effect is Cannan v. Bryce, supra,
and U. S. Bank v. Owens, 2 Peters, 517 (1829).
Whether, as suggested by Judge Holmes, the line of proximity
may vary according to the gravity of the offense apprehended,
has received an answer from the cases. The discussion turns
upon a hypothetical case put by Eyre, 0. J., in Lightfoot v.
Tenant, supra. If a druggist sells arsenic, knowing at the time
that the buyer intends to poison his wife, the law would give him
no remedy. Nor would it to a person who sells drugs, knowing
that they are to be so mixed as to make beer contrary to an act of
Parliament. Though one offence is graver than the other, "the
body of the color is the same in all." In considering these two
transactions a Kentucky judge makes an important suggestion.
Where the intention is to commit murder, treason, or violations
of the fundamental rights of man and of society, Eyre's conclusion should be followed. Where, however, the intention is to
buy an article and make a fraudulent use of it; to borrow money
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to gamble with or to reloan at illegal rates of interest; to buy
goods in the regular course of business and smuggle them into
a foreign country; in which cases "the citizen may be neutral
without being guilty of incivism," knowledge alone, unaccompanied by an express understanding, or acts in aid of the illegal
purpose, will not invalidate the contract: Steele v. Curle, 4
Dana, 381 (1836). Followed in Bicel v. Sheetz, 24 Ind., 1
(1865), where the vendor in cases involving great moral turpitude is said to be an accessory before the fact.
Suppose we admit the law to be that knowledge of a present
intent to do an illegal or immoral act will make the contract
void. And also say, as was decided in Pearce v. Brooks, that
such knowledge will be presumed from the nature of the article
sold and the nature of the buyer's calling. Then, if by reason
of a change of mind, the contemplated act is not done, there
can nevertheless be no recovery. Moreover, a gambler or a
prostitute, trusting to the notoriet of their respective callings
and the plaintiff's ignorance of the law, may buy expensive
furnishings and prosper, unmolested by suit. With regard to
furnishing money or goods to a gambler, Judge Comstock in
Tracy v. Talmadge, supra, gave the following opinion: "Money
may be it
loaned
in result
a gambling
house for
of
staking
on the
of a game;
the the
law specific
says it purpose
cannot be
recovered. But suppose a broker or a banker lends money in his
office and in the regular course of his business, knowing his
customer to be a gambler by habit, and believing that he wants
the money for gambling purposes: if the illegal desigii does not
enter at all into the negotiation of the contract, if it forms no part
of the inducement of the transaction, will the knowledge or
belief of the lender prevent him from recovering the money when
it is due? Such a doctrine would be highly inconvenient in a
commercial community."
In Pennsylvania, Badgely v. Beates, 3 Watts, 263 (1834).
oibson refused a recovery of wages on a contract to serve as
marker at an illicit billiard table. Re stated the rule broadly to
the effect that any contract that aids or encourages, however
remotely, a prohibited act is void. The force of the decision,
however, is greatly lessened by Braui
v. Keally, 146 Pa., 519
(1892), where, on facts very similar to the principal case, the
contract was held valid.

N EGLIGENqCE

-

UNLAWF'-UL ACT

-

INJURIES

-

INTERvEN ING

OAUSE-ExcusE.-OSbcrnO v. Yam Dylee, Supreme Court of
Iowa, April 12, 1901.-A., an employe of B., was holding a horse
belonging to B., while the latter was applying a wash to a galled
place on the horse's neck. As the horse was nervous and restless
it became necessary to put on him a twitch, which B. held with
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the halter while the wash was applied. After removing the
twitch, B. attempted to wash another spot, but the horse jumped
aside, and struck B. Being angered, he began beating the horse
with a heavy stick with a nail in the end, although A. tried to
get him to desist. Finally B. slipped, and a blow aimed at the
horse unintentionally struck A. in the face, breaking his nose and
otherwise injuring him. The court instructed that the defendant would not be liable, if in beating the horse he exercis~d
reasonable care to avoid striking the plaintiff, and the blow which
inflicted the injury was caused by an accidental slip, for which
the defendant was not to blame, and further, that this would be
so even if defendant in beating the horse, was guilty of an
unlawful act.
The Supreme Court held these instructions erroneous, because
he overlooked the question as to whether it was negligence for
defendant to strike the horse in the manner he did under the
circumstances. If it was, he is liable for the natural and probable
consequences of his act, even though the precise result which
followed may not have been anticipated. "The fact that the
accident was so unusual and extraordinary that it could .not
reasonably have been expected to happen, does not relieve defendant from effect of its negligence." (Doyle v. Railway Co., 77
Iowa, 607. An "accident" may be defined as an event happening
unexpectedly and without fault. Now the defendant here cannot be said to be without fault for the slip of his foot, if it grew
out of or resulted from his negligent act. "The fact that some
other cause operated with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injuries complained of will not relieve him from liability, if the wrong concurring with such other cause was the
proximate cause of the injury." (Gould v. Scherneer, 101 Iowa,
583.)
As to the question whether the act of defendant in whipping
or striking his horse was unlawful, it is claimed by plaintiff that
if defendant was engaged in the doing of an unlawful act which
resulted in injury to plaintiff, such conduct would be negligence
as matter of law. In doing the act, the defendant violated §4969
of the Code, which imposes a penalty for cruelty to animals.
"The general rule of law is that whoever does an illegal or wrongful act is answerable for all the consequences that ensue in the
ordinary and natural course of events." I Add. Torts, 7. In
Messenger v. Pate, 42 Iowa, 443, the court announced the following rule of law: "Whenever an act is enjoined or prohibited
by law, and the violation of the statute is made a misdemeanor,
any injury to the person of another caused by such violation is
the subject of an action; and it is sufficient to allege the violation
of the law as the basis of the right to recover, and as constituting
the negligence complained of." If the defendant was doing an
unlawful act in beating the horse, he is liable for damages caused
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555

thereby, and the subsequent accidental slip would not shield him.
In opposition to this view the defendant cited the case of Tingle
v. Railway. 60 Iowa, 333, where plaintiff sought to recover
damages for the death of a cow at a place where the public highway crosses the railroad track. The company was unlawfully
operating its trains on Sunday in violation of provisions of the
Code, but it was held that the railroad company is not liable for
the injury in the absence of negligence on the part of the company, or its employes. In this case, the unlawful act was a condition, but not a cause of the injury done, and there was no
negligence involved, hence it is clearly distinguishable from the
case at bar. It must appear then from the authorities cited that
the defendant is clearly liable for his negligence, and is not excused from its consequences, by the so-called intervening accident.

